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1  | INTRODUC TION
Health apps, including consumer-oriented fitness apps, typically 
have two functions. Firstly, they track health-related data, like 
weight, calories, heart rate, steps, etc. This allows users to gain an 
overview of their health and fitness in terms of such quantifiable 
criteria. Notably, they allow users to check their personal develop-
ment over time. For example, users may witness that they are losing 
weight while regularly exercising, eating healthier, and consuming 
fewer calories, thus getting quantifiable “proof” of their improving 
health. In fact, such progress is precisely one of the main reasons to 
use health apps in the first place. Accordingly, the second function of 
health apps is to initiate and foster a change in behavior in their users 
toward a healthier lifestyle. Health apps are, in this regard, an in-
stance of persuasive technology1 and often rely on strategies of pos-
itive feedback, gamification, or sharing results on social media for 
joint experiences (and allowing for social pressure) to motivate users 
 1See IJsselsteijn, W., de Kort, Y., Midden, C., Eggen, B., & van den Hoven, E. (Eds.). 
(2006). Persuasive technology: First international conference on persuasive technology for 
human well-being, PERSUASIVE 2006, Eindhoven, The Netherlands, May 18–19, 2006, 
Proceedings. Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11755494
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Abstract
Health apps, including consumer-oriented fitness apps, have two functions. They are 
supposed to monitor and promote users’ health, the latter by way of being an in-
stance of persuasive technology. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) allows for AI 
health apps, i.e., health apps that act more and more autonomously when it comes 
to analyzing users’ health data and arriving at tailor-made results on how to improve 
their health. Consequently, AI health apps seem to gain a paternalistic potential. This 
is a game-changer, for corresponding issues of paternalism can then no longer be 
traced back to human engineers. Instead, the paternalizing party just is the AI system. 
Hence, AI health apps lead to the novel issue of AI paternalism in health care. In this 
paper, I explore this novel phenomenon and its ethical implications. Firstly, I discuss 
from a critical perspective whether the notion of AI paternalism makes (conceptual) 
sense to begin with. Unsurprisingly, I argue that it does and how so. Secondly, I briefly 
indicate important ethical issues that AI paternalism in health apps raise and which 
need to be discussed in more detail in order to judge under which conditions (certain 
forms of) AI paternalism might be considered acceptable, if at all.
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accordingly. In short, the purpose of health apps is to monitor and 
promote users’ health.2
So far, health apps are for the most part rigidly designed by 
human engineers who implement a specific set of health-related 
goals or values—usually to choose among by the user—and a certain 
way of how to change the user’s behavior, e.g., by specific gamifica-
tion routines or by letting the app make predefined suggestions on 
exercises or nutritional behavior. However, the ever-increasing use 
of artificial intelligence (AI) in society,3 including the health care 
domain, introduces the possibility of AI health apps, i.e., health 
apps that include machine or deep learning algorithms, and that 
may act more and more autonomously when it comes to analyzing 
users’ health data and arriving at tailor-made results on how to im-
prove their health. A first example of this might be Amazon’s re-
cently announced Halo.4 In general, such AI health apps would be 
capable of:
1. analyzing their users’ behavior in light of the individual user’s 
tracked health data against a more encompassing database of 
general (quantified) information on human health,
2. “drawing conclusions,” i.e., computing results, as to which behav-
ior would benefit the individual user (best) against a predefined 
(quantified) notion of health as well as general information on suf-
ficiently similar persons, and,
3. based on tracked user data, both health and non-health related, 
and general information on success rates of motivation strategies, 
influencing the individual user’s decision-making and behavior ac-
cordingly, for example by way of making tailor-made “nudging” 
suggestions on what to do or by means of gamification.
Arguably, such AI health apps may now be considered suffi-
ciently autonomous actors when it comes to influencing the users’ 
behavior for their own good. If so, it seems that AI health apps gain 
a paternalistic potential. While it is often claimed that health apps 
promote users’ autonomy in that users have to choose the goals 
themselves and the app merely functions as a tool to realize these 
goals more efficiently and successfully, AI health apps are 
game-changing. When assuming autonomously acting AI health 
apps, the scenario not only raises the question to what extent such 
apps may still be thought of as promoting, or at least not undermin-
ing, users’ autonomy when influencing them for their own good, 
but it also leads to the problem that corresponding issues of pater-
nalism can no longer be traced back to human engineers. Instead, 
the paternalizing party just is the AI system.5 Hence, AI health 
apps, and to a certain degree AI-supported decision-making in gen-
eral, arguably lead to the novel issue of AI paternalism, particularly 
in the health care domain.6
Surprisingly, current debates in medical ethics and in ethics of 
technology are still lacking when it comes to acknowledging this pa-
ternalistic dimension of AI technology. For instance, it is telling that 
a paternalistic dimension is not even mentioned in the Nuffield 
Council’s roadmap for future research in AI.7 In the following, I will 
explore this novel notion of AI paternalism. Firstly, I will discuss from 
a critical perspective whether the notion makes (conceptual) sense 
to begin with, i.e., whether the traditional concept of paternalism can 
reasonably be applied. Unsurprisingly, I will argue that it can, albeit 
with some slight modifications. Secondly, I will briefly indicate im-
portant ethical issues that AI paternalism in health apps raise and 
which need to be discussed in more detail in order to judge under 
which conditions (certain forms of) AI paternalism might be consid-
ered acceptable, if at all.
 2This description of health apps is admittedly mostly positive in tone, as it focuses on the 
desired positive effects in improving users’ health. However, this is not supposed to 
imply that there is no room for criticism. In fact, the idea of a “quantified self,” including 
its reductionist notion of health, has quite correctly faced substantial criticism 
concerning our self-understanding as persons. The techniques of gamification and the 
possibly resulting social pressure when sharing results on social media raise serious 
concerns about the users’ autonomy. Finally, sharing one’s data “in the cloud” and letting 
companies that develop such apps have access to one’s personal (health) data raises 
equally serious concerns about users’ privacy. See Sharon, T. (2017). Self-tracking for 
health and the quantified self: re-articulating autonomy, solidarity, and authenticity in an 
age of personalized healthcare. Philosophy and Technology,30(1), 93–121; Danaher, J., 
Nyholm, S., & Earp, B. D. (2018). The quantified relationship. American Journal of 
Bioethics, 18(2), 3–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/15265 161.2017.1409823
 3For overviews of the debate about AI’s ethical implications, see Sullins, J. (2019). 
Information technology and moral values. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (summer 2019). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.
stanf ord.edu/archi ves/sum20 19/entri es/it-moral -value s/; Müller, V. C. (2020). Ethics of 
artificial intelligence and robotics. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (winter 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.
stanf ord.edu/archi ves/win20 20/entri es/ethic s-ai/
 4Amazon. (2020). Amazon Halo - YouTube. https://www.youtu be.com/chann el/UCkGJ 
iALRR LVVID IQ20R YoHg. Accessed September 7, 2020.
 5An anonymous reviewer suggested that, even in such cases, the paternalizing party 
could rather be identified as, for instance, the health insurance company if patients are 
compelled by them to use an AI health app. However, to my mind, AI health apps would 
still be game changing if they can be considered sufficiently autonomous actors as 
described above. A fitting analogy in this regard might be parents who instruct their 
older child to watch over the younger sibling. Even if the parents might ultimately be 
considered a paternalizing party, delegating the task with its concrete paternalistic 
interferences to the older child surely makes this child a (sufficiently autonomous) 
paternalizing party as well. Moreover, imagine cases in which there are no other actors, 
like health insurance companies, involved, but the AI health app is simply part of any 
user’s default set-up. Both scenarios should, therefore, make clear that AI health apps, 
indeed, present us with a novel situation, with them being the paternalizing party, after 
all.
 6In a way, this might jeopardize the major shift in medical ethics and practice from 
medical paternalism in the doctor-patient relationship to respecting patients’ autonomy, 
the latter of which is expressed in the requirement of getting patients’ informed consent. 
See Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2019). Principles of biomedical ethics (8th ed.). 
Oxford University Press, ch. 4.
 7Cp. Whittlestone, J., Nyrup, R., Alexandrova, A., Dihal, K., & Cave, S. (2019). Ethical and 
societal implications of algorithms, data, and artificial intelligence_ a roadmap for research. 
Nuffield Foundation. A notable exception is Wagner, N.-F. (2019). Doing away with the 
agential bias: Agency and patiency in health monitoring applications. Philosophy & 
Technology,32(1), 135–154. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1334 7-018-0313-7, who mentions 
and addresses a paternalistic dimension. Moreover, under the guise of epistemic 
paternalism, AI-supported decision-making is critically discussed in medical diagnosis and 
decision-making. See, for example, Grill, K., & Hansson, S. O. (2005). Epistemic 
paternalism in public health. Journal of Medical Ethics, 31(11), 648–653. https://doi.
org/10.1136/jme.2004.010850; McDougall, R. J. (2019). Computer knows best? The 
need for value-flexibility in medical AI. Journal of Medical Ethics, 45(3), 156–160. https://
doi.org/10.1136/medet hics-2018-105118; Nucci, E. D. (2019). Should we be afraid of 
medical AI? Journal of Medical Ethics, 45(8), 556–558. https://doi.org/10.1136/medet 
hics-2018-105281; Bjerring, J. C., & Busch, J. (2020). Artificial intelligence and 
patient-centered decision-making. Philosophy & Technology. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s1334 7-019-00391 -6; Axtell, G., & Bernal, A. (Eds.). (2020). Epistemic paternalism. 
Conceptions, justifications and implications. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
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2  | DOES THE NOTION OF AI 
PATERNALISM MAKE SENSE TO BEGIN 
WITH?
Consider the following traditional definition of paternalism:
“I suggest the following conditions as an analysis of 
X acts paternalistically towards Y by doing (omitting) Z:
1. Z (or its omission) interferes with the liberty or autonomy of Y.
2. X does so without the consent of Y.
3. X does so only because X believes Z will improve the welfare of Y 
(where this includes preventing his welfare from diminishing), or 
in some way promote the interests, values, or good of Y.”8
Would the notion of AI paternalism fit this concept of paternalism 
or at least a slightly revised version of it? Based on the definition 
Dworkin gives, four conditions can be derived that any occurrence 
of paternalism must meet. Consequently, if the notion of AI pater-
nalism in health apps is to make (conceptual) sense within the tradi-
tional definition of paternalism, AI health apps need to:
1. interact with users (Y) intentionally,
2. include a notion of what is (supposedly) good for Y,
3. interfere with the liberty or autonomy of Y, and
4. do so without Y’s consent.
Condition 1 already seems to exclude AI systems as possible pa-
ternalistic actors, for AI systems obviously do not have intentions. 
Only persons have intentions, i.e., mental states that include a repre-
sentation of a desired result of one’s future action and motivate one 
to act accordingly.9 However, certain AI systems, like AI health apps, 
may certainly be described as showing goal-oriented behavior.
As described above, the goal of AI health apps is to promote their 
users’ health. Moreover, AI health apps are defined as being suffi-
ciently autonomous in their behavior, notably in choosing the best 
(or most efficient) means to reach their goals.10 If so, a slight revision 
of paternalism’s traditional definition to include goal-oriented be-
havior suffices to allow the first condition to be met.
Concerning condition 2, AI systems likewise obviously do not (con-
sciously) have a concept of the good or uphold any ideas of what is good 
for Y, not even in terms of health. However, following condition 1, they 
do include a set of computable (quantifiable) criteria that serve as a defi-
nition of their goals. This may be understood in terms of a predefined 
pattern (of development) against which recognized patterns in tracked 
data can be compared. A match of patterns or an increasing resem-
blance of the recognized pattern to the predefined pattern may be con-
sidered in terms of the AI’s (increasing) success at reaching its goal. If so, 
it may be said that AI health apps behave as if they had a notion of what 
is good for Y. Yet, assuming that the pattern to be achieved is predefined 
by the AI system’s programmers, the (quantified) notion of health—or of 
the good in general—must be considered an external input and, thus, 
not autonomously chosen by the AI system itself. In any case, a slight 
revision to allow for “as if” means the second condition is met as well.
When considering condition 3, one might think at first that AI 
health apps are surely not capable of interfering with their users’ lib-
erty, in the sense of freedom of action. After all, how could an app 
physically hinder one to do what one wants? However, there are nu-
merous apps that are not limited to creating outputs on smartphones 
or tablets. Consider smart home apps, the purpose of which is to exert 
physical control over one’s home environment. Users may even dele-
gate a certain amount of physical control to them by automating cer-
tain aspects, like turning on the lights and music in the morning in order 
to wake up more easily. Moreover, imagine AI systems in cars capable 
of recognizing if the driver, upon entering the car, is too tired or drunk 
to drive safely and then prevent the car from starting. Future scenarios 
might even include more encompassing possibilities of personal AI as-
sistants interfering with their users’ liberties in their daily life. Hence, 
if linked to other systems capable of certain environmental control, AI 
health apps could interfere with users’ freedom of action, after all.
In addition, there can hardly be any doubt that AI health apps are 
able to influence their users’ behavior. Being an instance of persua-
sive technology, this is precisely what they are designed for in the 
first place. They may influence the users’ will-formation or deci-
sion-making process by making especially enticing suggestions or by 
raising the users’ awareness of certain possible options, while at the 
same time excluding other options in their suggestions. This holds 
even more if users are not aware that they are dealing with AI tech-
nology. Prevalent current examples are search results or suggestions 
on Google or Amazon, which are filtered based on algorithms. 
Accordingly, if users are not aware of the algorithmic filter, they 
might not even think of critically reflecting upon the results or look-
ing elsewhere as well. And even if users are aware of it, trusting or 
“blindly” following the results is just so easy and convenient. Hence, 
users’ will-formation and decision-making process are substantially 
influenced, which has already sparked a lively debate on whether 
this undermines users’ autonomy.11 Arguably, this holds all the more 
 8Dworkin, G. (2020). Paternalism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (fall 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanf 
ord.edu/archi ves/fall2 020/entri es/pater nalis m/, sec. 2.
 9Of course, defining “intention” in detail is much more complicated. For an overview, see 
Setiya, K. (2018). Intention. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 
2018). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanf ord.edu/archi 
ves/fall2 018/entri es/inten tion/
 10As such, they can be regarded as an instance of autonomously acting technologies, like 
self-driving cars or so-called “killer robots,” which raise troubling questions about the 
attribution of responsibility. The apparent exclusion of responsible human persons, in 
turn, s the (rudimentary) agency of AI health apps and their possible role as the 
paternalizing party. See Matthias, A. (2004). The responsibility gap: Ascribing 
responsibility for the actions of learning automata. Ethics and Information Technology,6(3), 
175–183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s1067 6-004-3422-1; Sparrow, R. (2007). Killer robots. 
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24(1), 62–77. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2007.00346.x
 11For a general overview of the ethics of manipulation, see Noggle, R. (2020). The ethics of 
manipulation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2020). 
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanf ord.edu/archi ves/
sum20 20/entri es/ethic s-manip ulati on/. For an overview of the debate on AI technology 
manipulating behavior and influencing autonomy, see Müller, op. cit. note 3, sec. 2.2.
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if the AI technology in question is supposed to promote users’ 
well-being and users are aware of this, like in the case of AI health 
apps. Imagine the AI health app making suggestions on what to eat, 
including corresponding shopping lists and recipes, all based on an 
analysis of the particular user’s health and which eating habits would 
likely improve it. These suggestions might even acknowledge proba-
ble food intolerances, of which the user is still unaware, and thus 
exclude corresponding ingredients right from the start. If users are 
confident that trusting or even “blindly” following their AI health 
app’s suggestions will be beneficial for their health, precisely be-
cause this is what the app is designed for, this might even be charac-
terized as users delegating the respective choices, and thus their 
respective autonomy, to the app. Overall, there can hardly be any 
doubt that the third condition of applying the traditional concept of 
paternalism to the phenomenon of AI paternalism is met.
The fourth condition again raises conceptual doubts. After all, 
if users need to install and use an AI health app intentionally, this 
obviously means that they—even explicitly—consent to it. However, 
it can be argued that a general consent to use an app does not nec-
essarily mean that one consents to each and every specific influence 
on autonomy, especially if one is not aware of all specific influences 
on one’s will-formation or decision-making process, like notably the 
exclusion of specific results and options. As discussed before with 
regard to the third condition, the app’s influence on users’ auton-
omy might be subtler and more complex than a general consent to 
use the app may cover. Consider again the example of the AI health 
app excluding certain types of food in its suggestions on what to 
eat based on its ongoing analysis of the user’s health data. It is far 
from clear that by intentionally using the app in general, the user has 
also explicitly consented to all such specific exclusions. This is even 
more obvious if users are not even aware that the AI functionality 
might comprise such exclusions at some point based on its learning 
algorithm. After all, how can we consent to something if we do not 
even know about it?
As an analogy, imagine generally allowing a friend to make sug-
gestions and influence your decision-making in your everyday life. 
While such a general consent may very well cover that the friend 
will take action even if not specifically asked to, there is arguably 
still room for specific criticism if the friend, on specific occasions, 
purposefully tries to influence you without informing you about it or 
tries to hide in principle valuable options from you just because he 
or she thinks that these options will do you no good. If this analogy 
and the intuition about possible criticism in specific cases are plau-
sible, one may conclude that the fourth condition is met as well, at 
least when it comes to paternalistic influences in specific cases and 
notably if users are not even aware of them.
In addition, one might think of future scenarios in which personal 
AI assistants are ubiquitous and also include the functionality of AI 
health apps by default, maybe even without this being advertised 
explicitly or only mentioned in the fine print—which usually nobody 
reads. Arguably, this puts into question the idea of users having con-
sented to all its influences on one’s life even more—and such future 
scenarios might be closer than we realize.
If the above considerations are plausible, all four conditions are 
met, albeit partially in a slightly revised version. Hence, the notion of 
AI paternalism, indeed, makes (conceptual) sense. Reformulating and 
adapting Dworkin’s traditional definition of paternalism, AI paternal-
ism in health apps can thus be characterized as follows: AI health apps 
are capable of showing a paternalistic goal-oriented behavior toward users 
in that they (a) might interfere with their liberty or influence their auton-
omy, (b) of which users might not even be aware or at least have not con-
sented to on specific occasions, and (c) do so because of their goal-oriented 
programming in terms of promoting users’ (quantifiable) health.
However, while this introduces the general conceptual possibil-
ity of AI paternalism, it is helpful to discuss the possible types of 
paternalistic interference by AI health apps in more detail.12 In the 
following, I will discuss two important distinctions in this regard, 
namely between hard and soft paternalism, including the notion of 
nudge paternalism, on the one hand, and between strong and weak 
paternalism, on the other. The most prominent distinction is likely 
between hard and soft paternalism. While hard paternalism marks an 
interference with a person’s liberty, i.e., freedom of action, regard-
less of whether the person has made an autonomous decision, soft 
paternalism is intended to check whether a person’s decision is (suf-
ficiently) autonomous or to promote the person’s autonomy by pro-
viding relevant information or insights. Yet, if the person is deciding 
or acting (sufficiently) autonomously, no further interference or in-
fluence is allowed.13
When it comes to AI paternalism, both hard and soft paternalism 
seem problematic to apply. Hard paternalism may only come into play 
for AI health apps if these are linked to suitable environmental con-
trols, for only then are such apps able to interfere with users’ freedom 
of action. Moreover, when considering soft paternalism, it is hard to 
imagine how AI health apps would be able to check users’ (sufficient) 
autonomy. However, AI health apps—just as it is argued for “tradi-
tional” health apps—may very well be considered to be promoting 
users’ autonomy by providing important information and “insights,” 
namely the results of the individual user‘s health data analysis, e.g., 
the likelihood of a specific food intolerance. If so, AI health apps may 
act in a soft paternalistic way by influencing the user to make more 
autonomous decisions about, for instance, what to eat.
The latter aspect of influencing users’ decision-making leads to 
another prominent type of paternalism, namely nudge paternalism.14 
The main idea of nudging persons to make better decisions concern-
ing their health and well-being is to make these better options more 
attractive or easily accessible, without explicitly hindering persons 
to act otherwise. This way, people’s decision-making process is—
more or less subtly—influenced for their own good.
 12For the following distinctions, cp. Dworkin, op. cit. note 8, sec. 2.
 13The classical example of a person wanting to cross a bridge, not knowing that it is 
unsafe, which is why we are allowed to hinder her at first and inform her about the 
bridge’s unsafety, can be found in Mill, J. S. (1859). On liberty. In J. M. Robsen (Ed.), 
Thecollected works of John Stuart Mill, volume XVIII – Essays on politics and society part I 
(pp. 213–310). University of Toronto Press, 1977, p. 294.
 14See Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Nudge. Improving decisions about health, 
wealth and happiness (revised and expanded edition). Penguin.
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As an instance of persuasive technology, AI health apps may cer-
tainly be regarded as a prime example of such nudging paternalistic 
influence. As mentioned above, AI health apps may, for example, 
make a specific suggestion on what to eat, show the respective rec-
ipe, and add a corresponding shopping list. This undoubtedly makes 
it very convenient for users simply to follow this suggestion and, 
thus, opt for the better option in terms of their health.
The second important distinction is between strong and weak 
paternalism. While weak paternalism is defined by only interfer-
ing with the means people employ to pursue their goals, whatever 
these may be, strong paternalism also puts into question and in-
terferes with what people pursue as ends. For example, my friend 
might interfere with my decision to take the bus to be at a con-
cert in time because she thinks the bus will take too long, which 
is why she orders me a taxi. This is a case of weak paternalism 
because the goal of attending the concert at all is not questioned. 
However, if she prevented me from attending the concert because 
she thinks it will be a waste of my time and I should be doing some-
thing more meaningful instead, this would be an instance of strong 
paternalism.
AI health apps would apparently show a strong paternalism, as 
health is the only goal and users are precisely influenced to pursue 
it (better). However, this does not imply that health is treated as 
an end. It may also be regarded as a means only, even if it may be 
considered an all-purpose means that everyone should pursue for 
instrumental reasons. In any case, AI health apps are simply inca-
pable of distinguishing between health as a means and health as an 
end. Their goal-oriented behavior does not include such a specifi-
cation, even if only because there are no other (preprogrammed) 
goals that could force a comparison. Consequently, AI health apps’ 
paternalistic influence cannot meaningfully be described as either 
strong or weak paternalism, although users might be tempted to re-
flect on the value of health in their lives because of it, i.e., whether 
they consider health in their lives to be an (all-purpose) means or 
an end to be pursued for its own sake. Moreover, because of this 
inability of AI health apps to specify health as a means or an end, 
there is also no possibility of a combined strong and soft pater-
nalism because this would imply a paternalistic influence that aims 
at a critical reflection on the (quantified) notion of health within 
the broader context of users’ well-being and good life, i.e., to ad-
dress the normative question of which aspects should be pursued 
in life as ends. The (quantified) notion of health remains a prepro-
grammed, i.e., externally predefined goal of the AI health apps’ 
goal-oriented behavior.
3  | ETHIC AL ISSUE OF AI PATERNALISM 
IN HE ALTH APPS
The latter point leads to the first important ethical issue of AI health 
apps’ paternalistic influence. An externally defined notion of what is 
good for a person has traditionally been the crucial point of criticism 
of any form of paternalism—at least if the person interfered with is a 
sufficiently autonomous adult.15 Respecting someone’s freedom and 
autonomy means letting persons make their own decisions in life as 
long as no one else is negatively affected.16 However, it should be 
noted that still not all forms of paternalistic interference are shunned 
in modern medical ethics. For instance, the requirement of getting 
patients’ informed consent allows for soft medical paternalism, as pa-
tients’ initial wishes are not just taken and accepted at face value. 
Instead, patients need to be adequately informed about treatment 
options and their practical implications, so they can make a suffi-
ciently informed and thus more autonomous decision. In extreme 
cases, even hard paternalistic interferences are defended.17 Still, 
modern medical ethics and a liberal point of view more generally 
certainly put the onus on paternalism.
Consequently, the (quantified) notion of health in AI health apps 
is in need of a strong enough ethical justification in order to be ac-
ceptable. Yet, AI health apps cannot provide such a justification 
themselves, even if they may be considered sufficiently autonomous 
actors and capable of paternalistic influence. This is, firstly, due to 
agential constraints. AI health apps are not full-fledged persons ca-
pable of engaging in a meaningful debate about normative reasons. 
Secondly, and relatedly, the (quantified) notion of health needs to be 
externally defined and preprogrammed, which essentially calls for a 
normative social debate about how to define health.18 Even if there 
is sufficient room for a normative social consensus on a broad defi-
nition of health and its importance in people’s lives, there will argu-
ably always be conflicting positions concerning, at the very least, 
some of the details. A responsible design of AI health apps, there-
fore, needs to pay close attention to this debate about the notion of 
health and especially its (reductionist) quantifiability in order to ren-
der AI health apps’ paternalistic influences acceptable.
Additionally, even if health is taken as an important value—if only 
in terms of a valuable all-purpose means for everyone—it is certainly 
not the only ingredient of people’s well-being and of leading a good 
life. The normative social debate on health must, therefore, also in-
clude a critical reflection on health’s importance in comparison to 
other personal values and in light of more encompassing accounts of 
well-being and how to live a good and meaningful life.19 Clearly, this 
makes matters even more complex, but a responsible design of AI 
health apps needs to take this more complex critical reflection into 
account as well if a problematic reductionism of possible and 
 15See Kant, I. (1793). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of 
no use in practice. In M. J. Gregor (Trans.), Practical philosophy (pp. 271–309). Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, p. 291; Mill, op. cit. note 13, pp. 213–310. PP. 223f.
 16This is essentially Mill’s harm principle. See again Mill, op. cit. note 13, pp. 213–310. PP. 
223f.
 17See influentially Beauchamp & Childress, op. cit. note 6, ch. 4 & 6. For an even more 
striking defense of hard paternalism, see Conly, S. (2013). Against autonomy. Justifying 
coercive paternalism. Cambridge University Press.
 18See Murphy, D. (2020). Concepts of disease and health. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2020). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University. https://plato.stanf ord.edu/archi ves/sum20 20/entri es/healt h-disea se/
 19See Crisp, R. (2017). Well-being. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (fall 2017). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanf 
ord.edu/archi ves/fall2 017/entri es/well-being/; Fletcher, G. (Ed.). (2017). The Routledge 
handbook of philosophy of well-being. Routledge.
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legitimate personal values of AI health apps’ paternalistic influence is 
to be avoided.
However, any attempt at doing so likely faces the problem of AI 
technology’s opacity in terms of how results are reached.20 While 
this may be addressed in making the (quantified) notion of health, 
used as the preprogrammed goal of AI health apps, as well as its 
justification as transparent as possible, the AI health apps’ derivation 
of specific paternalistic influences on particular users’ autonomy will 
likely remain opaque. This is, of course, a general problem when em-
ploying AI technology, but AI health apps’ paternalistic influence 
makes it all the more pertinent.
Moreover, AI’s opacity leads to another ethical issue when con-
sidering AI health apps’ potential for soft paternalism, understood in 
terms of aiming at the promotion of users’ autonomy. If the AI’s re-
sulting suggestions and influences on improving users’ health are not 
or even cannot be translated into meaningful reasons and insights, 
i.e., ones that are understandable in terms of human reasoning, AI 
health apps’ potential for soft paternalism is considerably limited and 
the latter's possible justification is likely jeopardized. Hence, a re-
sponsible design of AI health apps needs to aim at some form of 
meaningfully translating the AI system’s results into humanly acces-
sible reasons. Arguably, it might already be helpful—if possible—to 
make recognized health patterns, like food intolerances, explicit, 
based on defining corresponding patterns as such. Otherwise, the 
use of and especially “blind” trust in AI health apps’ paternalistic in-
fluence might lead to an infantilization of users and, instead of a soft 
paternalistic promotion of users’ autonomy, actually undermine and 
diminish it.21
Furthermore, such “blind” trust in AI health apps’ accuracy might 
be misguided anyway, once one acknowledges the possibility of algo-
rithmic biases.22 This is especially problematic if such biases remain 
unnoticed. The (quantified) notion of health might very well be inap-
propriate for certain groups of people, and even if there are different 
definitions for different groups of people, the AI’s application to indi-
vidual users might still be off at least to some degree due to the more 
or less encompassing and fitting data to which it has access. If so, 
corresponding paternalistic influences might not be beneficial for 
particular users, after all. Consequently, a responsible design of AI 
health apps must include making such possible biases explicit, ideally 
avoid them, and responsibly using such apps requires being aware of 
them.
Finally, it might go without saying nowadays, but AI health apps 
will certainly raise ethical issues of privacy, especially if data needs 
to be sent and computed “in the cloud” instead of working only lo-
cally on the user’s own device and not shared elsewhere.23 Hence, 
even if AI health apps’ paternalistic influence on users were benefi-
cial for them and did not undermine or diminish their autonomy, such 
apps might still end up being considered ethically problematic. 
Consequently, developing possibly paternalistic AI health apps 
should also include a privacy by design approach24 in order to ensure 
ethical acceptability in this regard.
However, while the importance of the abovementioned ethical 
issues can hardly be denied and addressing them convincingly both 
in normative ethical debate and in the future design of AI health apps 
is undoubtedly crucial, one can also hardly deny the potential ben-
efits of AI health apps’ paternalistic influences on users’ health and 
overall well-being. If designed in an ethically responsible way, (some 
forms of) AI health apps’ paternalistic influence might well be consid-
ered ethically acceptable.
4  | CONCLUSION
I started with the assumption that AI health apps may be consid-
ered sufficiently autonomous actors when it comes to influencing 
the users’ behavior for their own good. If so, I have contended that 
they gain a paternalistic potential. Taking the traditional defini-
tion of paternalism as a starting point, I have argued that a slightly 
revised version of it can meaningfully be adapted to the novel phe-
nomenon of AI paternalism in health apps: AI health apps are capa-
ble of showing a paternalistic goal-oriented behavior toward users in 
that they (a) might interfere with their liberty or influence their au-
tonomy, (b) of which users might not even be aware or at least have 
not consented to on specific occasions, and (c) do so because of their 
goal-oriented programming in terms of promoting users’ (quantifiable) 
health.
Assuming that my conceptual considerations are plausible, AI 
health apps’ paternalistic influence may show as hard, soft, or nudge 
paternalism. This paternalistic potential leads to a number of ethical 
issues, notably the (quantified) notion of health employed, the opac-
ity of how particular paternalistic influences are reached and may be 
justified, the potential of users’ infantilization and of undermining 
their autonomy because of it and because of users’ possible “blind” 
trust in the app, the probability of implicit biases in the (quantified) 
notion of health, and possible issues of privacy. All of these issues 
need to be addressed convincingly, both in normative social and eth-
ical debate about health in general and AI health apps in particular as 
well as when designing such apps.
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